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Abstract
On November 10, 1980, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) published an amendment to the Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Sex1 which stated: “[t]his amendment will
re-affirm that sexual harassment is an unlawful employment practice.”
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INTRODUCTION

On November 10, 1980, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) published an amendment to the Guidelines on

Discrimination Because of Sex1 which stated: "[t]his amendment will
re-affirm that sexual harassment is an unlawful employment practice."

It is rare indeed for a federal agency to understate the impact of its
guidelines 6r regulations, but this is such a time. The amendment goes

far beyond reaffirming that sexual harassment constitutes an unlawful
employment practice; in essence it redefines what conduct constitutes
sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2
BEFORE THE GUIDELINES

Many federal court decisions have held that sexual harassment is

an unlawful employment practice.3 Generally, those decisions required
a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment by
proving:
1) submission to sexual advances of a supervisor was a term or condition
of employment;
* A.B. Hamilton College; J.D. Rutgers-Camden Law School; Chief, Legal
Branch, United States Environmental Protection Agency, Region III; formerly Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University of Law. This article was written by Mr.
Martin in his private capacity. No official support or endorsement by the Environmental Protection Agency or any other agency of the federal government is intended or
should be inferred.
1. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq (1979).
3. See, e.g., Tompkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir.
1977); Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977).
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2) this submission substantially affected plaintiff's employment; and
3) employees of the opposite sex were not affected in the same way by

these actions."
While the new guidelines do not specifically address the third requirement, there must be evidence of gender-based discrimination in
Title VII suits. If a supervisor makes the same sexual demands of both
male and female employees, i.e., a bisexual supervisor, the supervisor
may not be engaging in an employment practice prohibited by Title
VII.5 But as at least one court observed, the third requirement is generally read such that it may only be an issue in the case of a bisexual
supervisor:
It is not necessary to a finding of a Title VII violation that the discriminatory practice depend on a characteristic "peculiar to one of the gen-

ders," or that the discrimination be directed at all members of a
sex. . . . It is only necessary to show that gender is a substantial factor
in the discrimination, and that if the plaintiff "had
been a man she
'6
would not have been treated in the same manner.
In contrast to Title VII's nominal impact on the gender discriminatory element in traditional sex harassment claims, the new guidelines
have a significant impact on the other two elements of the plaintiff's
prima facie case. Prior to the guidelines, Title VII judicial decisions
carry the notion that harassment must be done by a supervisor or another in a position to make sexual advances a "term or condition of
employment." For example, in Fisher v. Flynn,1 the court stated:
"Plaintiff has not alleged a sufficient nexus between her refusal to accede to the romantic overtures and her termination. She has not alleged
that the department chairman had the authority to terminate her employment or effectively recommend the same and we cannot so
S
assume."
Moreover, the language, "term or condition of employment,"
4.
5.
6.
1977).
7.
8.

Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382, 1389 (D. Colo. 1978).
See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1047 n.4 (3d Cir.
598 F.2d 663 (1st Cir. 1979).
Id. at 665.
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presents another problem. Conduct which most civilized people would
find offensive and actionable may not give rise to a statutory violation
unless it is shown to be a "term or condition of employment." For example, in Bundy v. Jackson,9 the plaintiff fared well in terms of promotions, moving through the civil service ranks from a GS-4 in 1970 to a
GS-9 in 1976. In its findings of fact, the Bundy court noted that two of
plaintiff's supervisors had made persistent sexual advances. 10 Although
the court concluded that "[p]laintiff's allegations with regard to improper sexual advances made to her by other Department employees
(recall that both Burton and Gainey were supervisors) are fully
proved, . . . [d]efendant did not discriminate in any term or condition
of her employment. . . ... In other words, the plaintiff lost her case

not because she was unable to prove sexual harassment (since the court
found that the incidents occurred), but rather because she failed to
show any economic detriment. As discussed below, Bundy, and its reversal on appeal, is an excellent example of the judicial climate before
and after the guidelines.
In another pre-guidelines case, the court in Tomkins v. Public
Service Electric & Gas Co., 2 stated:
we conclude that Title VII is violated when a superior, with the actual or
constructive knowledge of the employer, makes sexual advances or demands toward a subordinate employee and conditions that employee's
9. 19 F.E.P. Cases 828 (D.C.D.C. 1979), rev'd, 641 F.2d 934, 945 (D.C.C.A.
1981).
10. Id. at 830-31.
On numerous occasions, Burton called her into his office on Monday mornings to
talk about her activities over the weekend, asking her if she liked horses. When
plaintiff responded that she rode horses, Burton claimed that he had heard that
women who rode horses had a tendency to need sexual relief and rode them for
that purpose . . . Burton repeated on numerous other occasions that he had
other sexual literature which was not of the type one could buy in a bookstore
and that plaintiff should come to his apartment to see it....
After Gainey became plaintiff's first line supervisor, he made several advances to her. On one occasion he stated to her, "Sandy, I've been after you for
the last two years and you refuse all my attempts ....
You have turned me
down and I have been wanting to get-you to a motel ... "
11. Id. at 832. This holding was reversed in a decision that refers to the EEOC
guidelines with approval. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C.D.C. 1981).
12. 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).

Published by NSUWorks, 1981

3

Nova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 4
1408

Nova Law Journal

5:1981 1

job status-evaluation, continued employment, promotion, or other aspects of career development--on a favorable response to those advances
or demands .... 18

This view has prevailed in numerous other courts arriving at similar
conclusions. 4 The guidelines may change the results.
EEOC GUIDELINES
In contrast to the rule articulated in Tomkins and Bundy, EEOC
guidelines expand the protection offered to employees by including harassment caused not only by "agents and supervisory employees," 5 but
17
also by "fellow employees" 1 6 and in some cases by non-employees.
The "term or condition of employment" requirement is now one of
three disjunctive requirements that define sexual harassment actionable
under Title VII:
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of Title VII.
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a
term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or
rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual or (3) such conduct has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working

13. See Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975):
"[T]here is nothing in the Act [Title VII] which could reasonably be construed to have
it apply to verbal and physical sexual advances by another employee, even though he be
in a supervisory capacity where such complained of acts or conduct had no relationship
to the nature of the employment." See also Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F.
Supp. 1382, 1390 (D. Colo. 1978). "[F]requent sexual advances by a supervisor do not
form the basis of the Title VII violation that we find to exist. Significantly, termination
of the plaintiff's employment when the advances were rejected is what makes the conduct legally objectionable."
14. 568 F.2d at 1048-49.
15. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c).
16. Id. at § 1604.11(d).
17. Id. at § 1604.11(e).
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environment.1 8

While the power of the EEOC guidelines is still uncertain, 19 the
stated goal-eliminating an "intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment"--appears a radical departure from case law. The guidelines
also eliminate the absolute necessity of showing the harassment was
done by a supervisory employee and that it was a "term or condition of
employment." Although the guidelines may break with precedent, they
are consistent with the oft-stated view that Title VII is meant to be
interpreted broadly. Speaking of the breadth of section 703 of Title VII
(one basis of the EEOC guidelines), the court in Rogers v. EEOC20
said:
[It] evinces a Congressional intention to define discrimination in the
broadest possible terms. Congress chose neither to enumerate specific
discretionary practices, nor to elucidate in extenso the parameter of such
nefarious activities. Rather, it pursued the path of wisdom by being unconstrictive, knowing that constant change is the order of the day and
that seemingly reasonable2 practices of the present can easily become the
injustices of the morrow. 1
Elimination of an Intimidating, Hostile, or Offensive Working
Environment
EEOC has gone out of its way to reassure us that the guidelines do
not abruptly depart from case law. They stated that "[tihe courts have
found sexual harassment both in cases where there is concrete economic detriment to the plaintiff.

. .

and where unlawful conduct re-

sults in creating an unproductive or an offensive working atmo18. Id. at § 1604.11(a) (emphasis added).
19. As with most guidelines and regulations promulgated in the Title VII area,
the court's view of their persuasiveness seems to depend upon whether the guidelines or
regulations agree with the result the court wants to reach. See, e.g., Ablemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 451 (1975): EEOC guidelines said to be entitled to "great
deference." Compare Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973): "deference must have limits where, as here, application of the guidelines would be inconsistent with an obvious congressional intent not to reach the employment practice in
question."
20. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
21. Id. at 238.
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sphere.""2 EEOC cited Kyriarzi v. Western Electric Co.2" to support
the latter portion of this statement. Yet Kyriarzi seems an inappropriate case for EEOC to cite in support of its guidelines. Although the
court may have found "an unproductive or offensive working atmosphere," it also found that plaintiff's job performance ratings were suspect, and that plaintiff "did not receive the salary to which she was
entitled." 4
A later proceeding in Kyriarziz5 more clearly addressed the issue
of work environment. There the court stated:
While it is hardly this Court's role to penalize mere rudeness, when a
party's deliberate conduct is so extreme that it intentionally interferes
with another's ability to practice a profession or earn a livelihood, the
wrongdoer must be punished or deterred. It is clear from the conduct of
the individual defendant[s]
26

. . .

that they made Kyriarzi's work environ-

ment intolerable.

However, this statement must be read in light of the court's finding
that Kyriarzi had been denied promotions and raises.27
EEOC could also have pointed to dicta in Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 28 a landmark case on sexual harassment. The
court there declined to find that sexual harassment, as prohibited by
Title VII, can exist where the harassment is not "a term or condition of
employment."
Appellant suggests an alternative theory of liability that, in addition to
prohibiting specific discriminatory acts, Title VII mandates that employees be afforded "a work environment free from the psychological harm
flowing from an atmosphere of discrimination." Analogizing to EEOC
findings of Title VII violations where employees have been subjected to
their supervisors' racial epithets and ethnic jokes.

. .

appellant contends

that the sexual advances and subsequent retaliatory harassment to which
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980).
461 F. Supp. 894 (D.N.J. 1978).
Id. at 943.
476 F. Supp. 335 (D.N.J. 1979).
Id. at 340.
Id. at 336.
568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
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she was subjected created an environment of debilitating sexual intimidation constituting a barrier to her employment opportunities. Because
we hold that the facts as alleged constitute a sex based condition of employment in violation of Title VII, we need not pass upon this second
theory."9
Although judicial precedent for the guidelines is limited to dicta in
two cases, the guidelines are well justified. In an era when the work
environment is being scrutinized for physically disabling factors, it
should also be scrutinized for psychologically disabling ones. Discrimination is harmful even in the absence of monetary harm. The Rogers
court spoke of the effect of ethnic discrimination on the work
environment:
[I]t is my belief that employees' psychological as well as economic
fringes are statutorily entitled to protection from employer abuse, and

that the phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" in Section 703 [of Title VII] is an expansive concept which sweeps within its
protective ambit the practice of creating a working environment charged
with ethnic or racial discrimination.30
In Bundy v. Jackson, the court of appeals held that women can
"sue to prevent sexual harassment without having to prove that...
their resistance [to the harassment] caused them to lose tangible job
benefits."3 1 Although the court based its decision on Rogers,3 2 it cited
with approval the EEOC guidelines in fashioning relief for the plaintiff.33 Thus the guidelines may be less a radical departure from case
law than an integrated and logical extension of the judicial precedent.

29. Id. at 1046 n.1. See generally Annot., 46 A.L.R. Fed 224 (1980). Concerning analogous cases involving other Title VII cases see, e.g., Compston v. Borden, Inc.,
424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976) [religion and ancestry]; Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 406 U.S. 961

(1972) [race].
30. 454 F.2d at 238.
31. 641 F.2d at 945.
32.
33.

Id.
Id. at 947.
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Sexual Harassment and the Employer
An employer may find himself a defendant in a Title VII suit for
the acts of his supervisors, acts of his employees, and in some instances
the acts of non-employees. "A purely personal, social relationship without discriminatory employment effect" is not prohibited;3 4 the guidelines still require a connection between the harassment and the employer before he may be held liable for damages.
Under the guidelines, the employer is strictly liable for sexual harassment done by an agent or supervisor:
Applying general Title VII principles, an employer, employment agency,
joint apprenticeship committee or labor organization (hereinafter collectively referred to as "employer") is responsible for its acts and those of
its agents and supervisory employees with respect to sexual harassment
regardless of whether the specific acts complained of were authorized or
even forbidden by the employer and regardless of whether the employer
knew or should have known of their occurrence. 85
The imposition of strict liability for harassment by agents or supervisors is consistent with case law. The court in Miller v. Bank of
America36 held the employer was not immunized by lack of knowledge
37
of the harassment or by company policy against such harassment.
The employer can take steps to limit his liability for sexual harassment done by non-supervisory employees. Prior to promulgation of the
guidelines, employers' liability for sexual harassment was generally
limited to liability for behavior of supervisory personnel. The guidelines
now state:
With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have
known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and
appropriate corrective action."
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

45 Fed. Reg. 25,024 (1980).
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c).
Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 213.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d).
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For acts between co-employees, the potential for liability on the part of
the employer is less than for acts of supervisors. This may be justified,
since an employee probably feels he is exposing himself to less risk in
complaining about a fellow employee than in complaining about harassment by a supervisor. Thus the employer is potentially better informed, and better able to remedy the situation. It is also important to
note the correlation between the expanded liability of the employer and
the expanded definition of sexual harassment. Employers would be well
advised to handle sexual harassment between co-employees in a prudent manner.39
Additionally, an employer may be liable for harassment of his employees by non-employees. Although obscure on this point, the guidelines suggest that employer liability might extend, for example, to independent contractors. The guidelines state:
An employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-employees, with
respect to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace, where the
employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have
known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate cor-

rective action. In reviewing these cases the Commission will consider the
extent of the employer's control and any other legal responsibility which
the employer
may have with respect to the conduct of such nonemployees.40
To this meager guidance, the "supplementary information" issued with
the guidelines merely adds that "[s]uch liability will be determined on
a case-by-case basis, taking all facts into consideration. ' 41 Absent a
situation where the non-employee is perceived as an employee, subject
to normal employee rules, courts may be unlikely to find the employer
liable for acts done by such persons.
In the light of the above discussion, the employer should take steps
to limit his liability. Although both the courts42 and the guidelines impose strict liability on the employer for sexual harassment by a supervisor, the employer should act promptly to minimize liability in situations
39.
40.
41.
42.

See text accompanying notes 43-49 infra.
Id. at § 1604.11(e).
45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980).
600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
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involving non-supervisory personnel. The following steps are suggested
for employers:4 3
1. Establish and publicize a strong policy against sexual harassment;
2. Establish an internal grievance procedure to handle claims of sexual
harassment;
3. Follow up on any information received, or any other reason to believe,
that sexual harassment is taking place;
4. Investigate any claims of sexual harassment fully; and
5. If harassment is found, rectify the situation by reprimanding, suspending or dismissing employees who engaged in the sexual harassment.
While not guaranteeing immunity for an employer, these procedures
are consistent with the guidelines; 4 ' and seem to be a prerequisite for
avoiding liability for the acts of co-employees and designated non-employees. Such good-faith programs by the employer may even affect the
extent of liability for the acts of supervisory employees.
In the "supplementary information" accompanying the guidelines,
EEOC noted that many comments were received in response to the Interim Guidelines. These responses voiced concern that the guidelines
covering employer procedures for prevention and reporting programs
were "not specific enough.' 4 5 The guideline states in pertinent part:
An employer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring, such as affirmatively raising the subject, expressing
strong disapproval, developing appropriate sanctions, informing employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of harassment
under
46
Title VII, and developing methods to sensitize all concerned.
Replying to the comments received, EEOC clarified its position: it
did not intend to provide rules, but intended to encourage each employer to develop an "individualized" program.' 7 The five points above
are indeed merely suggestions; the employer must assess his own inter-

43.
C.F.R. §
44.
45.
46.
47.

See Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Colo. 1978); 29
1604.11(0.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(0.
45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980).
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f).
45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980).
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nal bureaucracy in devising procedures to insure that he learns of any
sexual harassment at the earliest possible moment and properly resolves
any problems quickly. For example, some companies may find it desirable to have rules about socializing between supervisory and non-supervisory personnel. While the EEOC does not attempt to prevent purely
social relationships, a particular employer may choose to do so.
Alternatively, it may be prudent for the employer to adapt existing
company rules governing other personnel policies, which have proven
effective, to handle allegations of sexual harassment. This course of action may better protect the rights of the accused supervisor/employee/
non-employee. Since not all claims of sexual harassment are well
founded, the reputation of the accused must be reasonably protected.
An existing, effective complaint-and-hearing system may already protect the rights of all the parties in that workplace.
The guidelines fail to instruct the employer on disciplining the offending employee beyond suggesting the development of "appropriate
sanctions. 14 8 As a practical matter, the guidelines may make firing the
guilty employee the only "safe" remedy, even though circumstances
could otherwise dictate demotion or suspension. Take, for example, the
situation where a supervisor is engaged in sexual harassment. If he is
demoted to a non-supervisory function, the harassment may continue;
and the employer may still be liable under the guidelines. The employer's failure to fire the offender initially may be construed as a failure to express strong disapproval of sexual harassment. Again EEOC
suggested a case-by-case analysis. The appellate court in Bundy suggested an injunction requiring the employer to use warnings and other
"appropriate discipline."4 9 It thus appears that the normal array of disciplinary actions, even mere warnings, remains available to the employer, as long as "appropriate."
There is, however, a great deal to be said for severe punishment of
a person guilty of sexual harassment; such conduct has been condoned
for too long. As in racial discrimination, strong action may be necessary to achieve results. The 1970's were to sexual harassment what the
1950's were to racial discrimination. In the long road ahead, some
firings may be necessary to insure progress.

48. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(0.
49. 641 F.2d at 947.
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The EEOC final guidelines contain a section not found in the interim guidelines; it deals with sexual favoritism. In part it states:
Where employment opportunities or benefits are granted because of an
individual's submission to the employer's sexual advances or requests for
sexual favors, the employer may be held liable for unlawful sex discrimination against other persons who were qualified for but denied that employment opportunity or benefit. 50
If there is a section in the guidelines that stands noble in theory but
becomes only empty words in application, this is it. EEOC suggested
the potential of the section in its "supplemental information;" [e]ven
though the Commission does not consider this to be an issue of sexual
harassment in the strict sense, the Commission does recognize it as a
related issue which would be governed by general Title VII principles." 51 But consider the problems of proof. How does one prove that
an employee's advancement was the result of sexual favors if both the
supervisor and the promoted employee say otherwise? Unlike most harassment claims where the parties to the sexual conduct are adversaries,
here they are co-defendants, not in an adversary position to each other.
The courts may find that cases decided on such potentially unreliable
evidence may make the cure worse than the disease.52
Sexual harassment is prevalent in the workplace. All one has to do
is read the newspaper or talk to those involved in personnel disputes to
discover the magnitude of the problem. If the guidelines function effectively, what results can we expect in the workplace atmosphere? It will
be many years before we can judge their full effect. But if they merely
increase public awareness of the problem, they will have a positive
effect.
There are those who will argue that what the guidelines define as
sexual harassment is not "harassment" but rather part of human nature-part of the interpersonal relationships that are bound to occur in
a workplace environment. In Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. 53 for example, the court said that even assuming the allegations of verbal and
50. Id. at § 1604.11(g).
51. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980).
52. Id. at 25,024.
53. 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975).
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physical sexual advances .by another employee were true, absent a
showing that the employer somehow benefitted from such harassment,
employer liability would not be found."
It would be ludicrous to hold that the sort of activity involved here was
contemplated by the Act [Title VII] because to do so would mean that if
the conduct complained of was directed equally to males there would be
no basis for suit. Also, an outgrowth of holding such activity to be actionable under Title VII would be a potential federal lawsuit every time
any employee made amorous or sexually oriented advances towards another. The only sure way an employer 5could
avoid such charges would be
5
to have employees who were asexual.
Such views will not be changed easily. Some employers will view
the guidelines as yet another federal intrusion into their lives. The
weight courts give the guidelines is the most important factor in predicting their long-term effects. Empirical evaluations of changes in the
workplace atmosphere will eventually yield answers to our questions.
BEYOND THE GUIDELINES

As expected, definitions of "sexual harassment" vary widely in
56
state laws. Wisconsin, for example, has a very narrow definition,
which in the words of one commentator "only reaches the most flagrant
types of sexual harassment." 57 He also noted that California has gone a
bit further and that Washington "has thrown by far the broadest
58

net.",
The EEOC guidelines will probably serve as a starting point for
state legislatures and administrative agencies attempting to curb sexual
harassment. For example, during the 1980 Florida legislative session,
Rep. Helen Gordon Davis (D-Tampa) introduced a bill which, after

54. Id. at 162-63.
55. Id. at 163-64.
56. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(5)(g)4 (West 1980) which reads: "For any employer, labor organization, licensing agency or person to make hiring, employment, admission, licensure, compensation, promotion or job assignments contingent upon a person's consent to sexual contact or sexual intercourse as defined in s. 940.225(5)."
57. NAT'L L.J., Apr. 21, 1980, at 6, col. 1.
58. Id.
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committee substitutions, tracked the approach and language of the interim EEOC guidelines.5 9 The bill passed in the Florida House of Representatives, but died when the Florida Senate Commerce Committee
refused to hear it. The 1981 legislative session also concluded without
progress in this matter.
While a statutory amendment to include sexual harassment within
the meaning of "discrimination on the basis of sex" now found in Florida Statutes Ch. 23, part IX, is a preferable solution, it is not the only
solution. A Florida court could find the broad approach taken by
EEOC controlling in a case before it. Even with no amendments to
Title VII, and before the EEOC guidelines, actions against sexual harassment brought in federal court were successful. The problem with
waiting for state courts to deal with sexual harassment, rather than
pressing for a legislative solution, is that they might be reluctant to
follow the EEOC guidelines that vary from prior federal decisions.6 0
Should Florida adopt the language and approach taken by EEOC?
The answer would seem to be yes, unless Florida can improve on
EEOC's language or approach. Perhaps more thought should be given
to the section concerning "sexual favoritism.""1 This section is weakly
worded, but may be acceptable if given the proper gloss by the courts.
As there are no other glaring deficiencies in the guidelines, they make
an acceptable model; there is no point in reinventing the wheel. If federal courts speak to the guidelines before state legislators consider the
language, those rulings could also be taken into account.
CONCLUSION

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency do not have a monopoly on improving
the "atmosphere" in the workplace. With its guidelines on sexual harassment, EEOC takes a large step toward making us aware that sexual
harassment is a serious and persistent problem. Although courts had
been reluctant to find actionable harassment absent some monetary or
similar detriment to the plaintiff, EEOC recognizes that harassment
59.

FLA. H.B. 331 (1980);
FLA. STAT. §§ 23.162(9)

FLA. C.S./H.B. 331, S.B. 332 (1980) (was to be codiand (10).
60. See, e.g., Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663 (1st Cir. 1979).
61. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(g).

fied in
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victims suffer other less tangible damages. The Bundy court has seen fit
to view sexual harassment as comparable to racial harassment, damaging even in the absence of monetary loss. That court pointed to the
guidelines with approval. One can hope this is the trend for the future..
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